

CLAIMS

What is claimed is:

- 1 1. A method of preventing buffer overrun security vulnerabilities comprising:
 - 2 executing a modified call routine for placing a random amount of empty space onto a stack;
 - 3 executing a called function; and
 - 4 executing a modified return routine for removing said random amount of empty space from
 - 5 the stack.
- 2 2. The method of claim 1, wherein said modified call routine comprises:
 - 3 placing a return address for the called function on the stack;
 - 4 calculating a random number;
 - 5 saving said random number in a secure location;
 - 6 placing a plurality of blank bytes equal to the random number onto the stack;
 - 7 building a stack frame by placing values from the called function onto the stack; and
 - setting an end of stack pointer to an end of the stack frame.
- 1 3. The method of claim 2, wherein said location is a processor register that is not generally
2 accessible.
- 1 4. The method of claim 1, wherein said modified return routine comprises:
 - 2 recalling a random number saved during an execution of said modified call routine;
 - 3 removing a number of bytes equal to said random number from the stack;
 - 4 retrieving a return address for the called function from the stack; and

5 setting an end of stack pointer to an end of a previous stack frame.

1 5. The method of claim 1, wherein said modified call routine comprises:
2 placing a return address for the called function on the stack;
3 calculating a hash value of stack invariants;
4 saving said hash value in a secure location; and
5 building a stack frame by placing values from the called function onto the stack.

1 6. The method of claim 5, wherein said secure location is a processor register that is not
generally accessible.

2 7. The method of claim 1, wherein said modified return routine comprises:
3 calculating a second hash value of stack invariants;
4 determining whether said second hash value matches a first hash value calculated during an
 execution of said modified call routine;
5 executing a stack corruption exception if said second hash value does not match said first
6 hash value; and
7 setting an end of stack pointer to an end of a previous stack frame if said second hash value
8 matches said first hash value.

1 8. A method of preventing buffer overrun security vulnerabilities comprising:
2 searching an executable program for all function calls at the time the executable is installed;
3 adding a random amount of blank space to all stacks generated by said function calls;
4 adjusting all references to said stacks to compensate for said blank space.

1 9. The method of claim 8, wherein said method is performed when said executable is installed.

1 10. The method of claim 9, further comprising saving said executable.

1 11. The method of claim 8, wherein said method is performed when said executable is loaded.

1 12. An apparatus comprising:

2 a storage device having stored therein one or more routines for preventing buffer overrun

3 security vulnerabilities; and

4 a processor coupled to the storage device for executing the one or more routines that, when

5 executing the routines, prevents buffer overrun errors by:

6 executing a modified call routine for placing a random amount of empty space onto a
7 stack;

8 executing a called function; and

9 executing a modified return routine for removing said random amount of empty space
10 from the stack.

1 13. The apparatus of claim 12, wherein said modified call routine comprises:

2 placing a return address for the called function on the stack;

3 calculating a random number;

4 saving said random number in a secure location;

5 placing a plurality of blank bytes equal to the random number onto the stack;

6 building a stack frame by placing values from the called function onto the stack; and

7 setting an end of stack pointer to an end of the stack frame.

1 14. The apparatus of claim 13, wherein said location is a processor register that is not generally
2 accessible.

- 1 15. The apparatus of claim 12, wherein said modified return routine comprises:
 - 2 recalling a random number saved during an execution of said modified call routine;
 - 3 removing a number of bytes equal to said random number from the stack;
 - 4 retrieving a return address for the called function from the stack; and
 - 5 setting an end of stack pointer to an end of a previous stack frame.

16. The apparatus of claim 12, wherein said modified call routine comprises:
 - placing a return address for the called function on the stack;
 - calculating a hash value of stack invariants;
 - saving said hash value in a secure location; and
 - building a stack frame by placing values from the called function onto the stack.

H 17. The apparatus of claim 16, wherein said secure location is a processor register that is not
2 generally accessible.

- 1 18. The apparatus of claim 12, wherein said modified return routine comprises:
 - 2 calculating a second hash value of stack invariants;
 - 3 determining whether said second hash value matches a first hash value calculated during an
 - 4 execution of said modified call routine;
 - 5 executing a stack corruption exception if said second hash value does not match said first
 - 6 hash value; and

7 setting an end of stack pointer to an end of a previous stack frame if said second hash value
8 matches said first hash value.

- 1 19. An apparatus comprising:
2 a storage device having stored therein one or more routines for preventing buffer overrun
3 security vulnerabilities; and
4 a processor coupled to the storage device for executing the one or more routines that, when
5 executing the routines, prevents buffer overrun errors by:
6 searching an executable program for all function calls at the time the executable is
7 installed;
8 adding a random amount of blank space to all stacks generated by said function calls;
9 adjusting all references to said stacks to compensate for said blank space.

- 1 20. The apparatus of claim 19, wherein said method is performed when said executable is
2 installed.

- 1 21. The apparatus of claim 20, further comprising saving said executable.
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1 22. The apparatus of claim 19, wherein said method is performed when said executable is loaded.

- 1 23. A machine-readable medium having stored thereon data representing sequences of
2 instructions, said sequences of instructions which, when executed by a processor, cause said
3 processor to prevent buffer overrun errors by:
4 executing a modified call routine for placing a random amount of empty space onto a stack;
5 executing a called function; and

6 executing a modified return routine for removing said random amount of empty space from
7 the stack.

1 24. The machine-readable medium of claim 23, wherein said modified call routine comprises:
2 placing a return address for the called function on the stack;
3 calculating a random number;

4 saving said random number in a secure location;
5 placing a plurality of blank bytes equal to the random number onto the stack;
6 building a stack frame by placing values from the called function onto the stack; and
7 setting an end of stack pointer to an end of the stack frame.

25. The machine-readable medium of claim 24, wherein said location is a processor register that
is not generally accessible.

26. The machine-readable medium of claim 23, wherein said modified return routine comprises:
recalling a random number saved during an execution of said modified call routine;
removing a number of bytes equal to said random number from the stack;
retrieving a return address for the called function from the stack; and
setting an end of stack pointer to an end of a previous stack frame.

27. The machine-readable medium of claim 23, wherein said modified call routine comprises:
placing a return address for the called function on the stack;
calculating a hash value of stack invariants;
saving said hash value in a secure location; and
building a stack frame by placing values from the called function onto the stack.

1 28. The machine-readable medium of claim 27, wherein said secure location is a processor
2 register that is not generally accessible.

1 29. The machine-readable medium of claim 23, wherein said modified return routine comprises:
2 calculating a second hash value of stack invariants;
3 determining whether said second hash value matches a first hash value calculated during an
4 execution of said modified call routine;
5 executing a stack corruption exception if said second hash value does not match said first
6 hash value; and
7 setting an end of stack pointer to an end of a previous stack frame if said second hash value
8 matches said first hash value.

1 30. A machine-readable medium having stored thereon data representing sequences of
2 instructions, said sequences of instructions which, when executed by a processor, cause said
3 processor to prevent buffer overrun errors by:
4 searching an executable program for all function calls at the time the executable is installed;
5 adding a random amount of blank space to all stacks generated by said function calls;
6 adjusting all references to said stacks to compensate for said blank space.

1 31. The machine-readable medium of claim 30, wherein said method is performed when said
2 executable is installed.

1 32. The machine-readable medium of claim 31, further comprising saving said executable.

1 33. The machine-readable medium of claim 30, wherein said method is performed when said
2 executable is loaded.

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